If the hardware signatures don’t match, it wont boot without giving a warning. If the TPM/Secure Enclave is replaced/removed/modified, it will not boot without giving a warning.
If the hardware is tampered, it will not pass the attestation test, which is an online component. It will fail immediately and you will be alerted. Thats the part of verified boot that makes this so much harder for adversaries. They would have to compromise both systems. The attestation system is going to be heavily guarded.
Thats correct. Thats one of the many perks.
EDIT: s/do anything/prevent booting/
If the hardware signatures don’t match, it wont boot without giving a warning. If the TPM/Secure Enclave is replaced/removed/modified, it will not boot without giving a warning.
Compromised hardware will say it is same hardware
Compromised hardware controls execution of software. Warning is done in software. Conpromised hardware won’t let it happen.
Compromised hardware doesn’t know the signatures. Math.
Compromised hardware can’t create new signatures, but it doesn’t matter because it controls execution of software and can skip any checks.
If the hardware is tampered, it will not pass the attestation test, which is an online component. It will fail immediately and you will be alerted. Thats the part of verified boot that makes this so much harder for adversaries. They would have to compromise both systems. The attestation system is going to be heavily guarded.
So, storing on Signal’s server key to decrypt keys. Welcome back to apple-isms and online-only.
Provided you have some other non-compromised way of communications.