tactics and habits learned in counter insurgency doesn’t translate to running and operating an actual insurgency
Is that actually true? The habits aren’t useful, but knowledge of the tactics seems incredibly useful! As an example, there’s plenty of narcotics agents that become highly successful drug dealers because their experience gives them insights. This seems similar.
Simple frontline troops don’t know how to be an insurgent because being an insurgent and a frontline soldier are too different things they can be taught but they don’t know it from the get go
They’re trained to identify, track, and fight insurgents. Seems like that’s a set of transferable skills and can be turned into dodging identification, frustrating trackers, and fighting counter insurgents.
The support arms are the ones doing the tracking and identifying and even the fighting is iffy since most of the time whenever they encounter insurgents the US just calls in an air strike, artillery or mortar team
It’s actually not that hard to believe before Iraq and Afghanistan the us army was trained to fight the soviet union and so their transition to being an anti insurgency force was pretty slow and didn’t start till after 9/11, it also didn’t help that by 2010 they effectively gave up on Afghanistan and Iraq
What in the world are you talking about? You can’t just make up claims because they sound right and affirm your stance.
The switch to counter insurgency oriented training began with the Vietnam war… which took place over 60-50 years ago. The disastrous counter insurgent performance of a military trained to fight the Soviets prompted a massive overhaul of US doctrine; especially as the prospect of war with the USSR became increasingly unlikely as the Union headed toward collapse. Actually, the effectiveness of the Afghans against the Soviets only intensified US military counter insurgency training and preparation.
Further, the vast majority of Usian veterans are overwhelmingly post-9/11 troops trained in counter insurgency operations before deployment to Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghan, Libya, and other nations where insurgency is the primary mode of combat.
I don’t know in what world you think the US abandoned Iraq, Syria, and Afghan in 2010. The army and national guard were rotating tens of thousands of troops into those nations continuously.
https://wavellroom.com/2023/10/27/us-army-counterinsurgency-doctrine/#%3A~%3Atext=This+article+argues+that+the%2Covercome+the+US+Army's+inflexibility.
“ After the end of the Vietnam War, the US Army shifted its focus from conducting counterinsurgency operations towards conventional warfare against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Counterinsurgency became less of a priority and was seen more as a distraction.[mote] Cassidy, Robert M., Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.), 100-101[/note] In line with the so-called Nixon Doctrine23, the US Army only planned to participate in a supporting role in counterinsurgency operations. Such a role, also called the advisory approach, included using advisors and providing resources but excluded the actual employment of combat forces. According to Ucko, this focus on the advisory approach prevented the Army from thoroughly engaging with counterinsurgency theories”
Your sources are a blog from a Australian Colonel, and a report from the brookings institute that quite literally supports my position and is the first thing that comes up when you look up “US counterinsurgency”
That’s some revolutionary research. Horrifically smarmy and disingenuous.
Is that actually true? The habits aren’t useful, but knowledge of the tactics seems incredibly useful! As an example, there’s plenty of narcotics agents that become highly successful drug dealers because their experience gives them insights. This seems similar.
Simple frontline troops don’t know how to be an insurgent because being an insurgent and a frontline soldier are too different things they can be taught but they don’t know it from the get go
They’re trained to identify, track, and fight insurgents. Seems like that’s a set of transferable skills and can be turned into dodging identification, frustrating trackers, and fighting counter insurgents.
The support arms are the ones doing the tracking and identifying and even the fighting is iffy since most of the time whenever they encounter insurgents the US just calls in an air strike, artillery or mortar team
I find it hard to believe that they have literally zero training in counter insurgency. Nothing? At all?
I mean that’s funny if it’s true, no wonder insurgents keep winning lol
It’s actually not that hard to believe before Iraq and Afghanistan the us army was trained to fight the soviet union and so their transition to being an anti insurgency force was pretty slow and didn’t start till after 9/11, it also didn’t help that by 2010 they effectively gave up on Afghanistan and Iraq
What in the world are you talking about? You can’t just make up claims because they sound right and affirm your stance.
The switch to counter insurgency oriented training began with the Vietnam war… which took place over 60-50 years ago. The disastrous counter insurgent performance of a military trained to fight the Soviets prompted a massive overhaul of US doctrine; especially as the prospect of war with the USSR became increasingly unlikely as the Union headed toward collapse. Actually, the effectiveness of the Afghans against the Soviets only intensified US military counter insurgency training and preparation.
Further, the vast majority of Usian veterans are overwhelmingly post-9/11 troops trained in counter insurgency operations before deployment to Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghan, Libya, and other nations where insurgency is the primary mode of combat.
I don’t know in what world you think the US abandoned Iraq, Syria, and Afghan in 2010. The army and national guard were rotating tens of thousands of troops into those nations continuously.
https://wavellroom.com/2023/10/27/us-army-counterinsurgency-doctrine/#%3A~%3Atext=This+article+argues+that+the%2Covercome+the+US+Army's+inflexibility. “ After the end of the Vietnam War, the US Army shifted its focus from conducting counterinsurgency operations towards conventional warfare against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Counterinsurgency became less of a priority and was seen more as a distraction.[mote] Cassidy, Robert M., Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.), 100-101[/note] In line with the so-called Nixon Doctrine23, the US Army only planned to participate in a supporting role in counterinsurgency operations. Such a role, also called the advisory approach, included using advisors and providing resources but excluded the actual employment of combat forces. According to Ucko, this focus on the advisory approach prevented the Army from thoroughly engaging with counterinsurgency theories”
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_counterinsurgency_ohanlon.pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA600359.pdf
I love being right
My timeline for Afghanistan was wrong I thought the troop drawdown was in 2010 but it was in 2011
Your sources are a blog from a Australian Colonel, and a report from the brookings institute that quite literally supports my position and is the first thing that comes up when you look up “US counterinsurgency”
That’s some revolutionary research. Horrifically smarmy and disingenuous.